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Introduction 
 The problem of organizing complex production has for the most part been 
analyzed by law and economics scholars in a dichotomous way:  production can be 
accomplished either through a series of market transactions and contracts, or under the 
guidance and control of a hierarchical governance structure within a firm.2  A rich and 
                                                 
1   Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, Professor of Law at the University of Illinois 
College of Law, and JSD candidate at the University of Illinois College of Law, respectively.  The authors 
have had the benefit of substantial research assistance from Everett Peaden, Bixuan Wu, Rebecca Conley, 
Lily Huang, and Tracy Dry Kane.  We appreciate the comments of participants in the IEA Research 
Workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, University of Trento; the 
University of Illinois and  Sun Yat-Sen University School of Law, Guangzhou, China, conference on the 
Role of Law in Economic Development; the Vanderbilt University Conference on Regulation; the 
International Society for the New Institutional Economics 2006 annual meeting; and faculty workshops at  
Vanderbilt University Law School, the University of Michigan, the University of Georgia Law School,  the 
University of North Carolina and Chicago-Kent School of Law.  Particular thanks are owed to Ed Rock and 
Oliver Williamson for their careful attention to earlier drafts, and to John Conley for his insights regarding 
the corporate social responsibility trend in business.  Despite the considerable efforts of these colleagues 
and students, the authors must accept responsibility for all remaining mistakes and omissions. 
2   The classics in this literature include Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 1 
(Nov.1937), and Oliver E. Williamson, MARKETS AND HIERACHIES:  ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975).  For much of the last three decades, "law and economics" scholars have tried to 
analyze “firms” as little more than “nexuses”, or devices through which a collection of contracts are 
coordinated, thus treating  enforcement through organizational structure and authority as a subset of 
contract enforcement.  But as Prof. Coase pointed out in The Nature of the Firm, firms are substitutes for 
contracts, see Coase, supra, at 4, a view that is reinforced by the reluctance of courts to get involved in 
settling disputes between two participants within a firm, whereas courts, or at least a credible threat of legal 
sanctions, are a standard enforcement mechanism for contracts between firms or between an individual and 
a firm. 
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well-developed literature has emerged in the last few decades analyzing these two modes 
(as well as some “hybrid” modes), and considering why one mode might be used in some 
circumstances, and the other in different circumstances.3  A more recent, but rapidly 
growing, literature has explored how globalization seems to be leading to more 
“outsourcing,” in which activities that were once carried on within a single firm are now 
being organized by contracts, across multiple firms, perhaps in multiple countries.4 
 Nearly all of the economic literature on choice of organizational form, 
globalization, and the “outsourcing” phenomenon, however, assumes the existence of an 
institutional context in which rule of law is followed, minimum social standards and 
business norms are established and regulated (or are at least commonly accepted and 
followed within a given trade), and contracts can be enforced.5   Given these 
characteristics of the institutional context, two firms that both operate in the United States 
or other developed counties, for example, can focus in their contracts with each other on 
the terms on which the subject of the contract will be carried out, without having to worry 
much about baseline or “default” terms.  If firm A hires firm B to clean its offices and 
facilities, for example, A will not have to specify that B may not use child labor, may not 
dump its waste products in the municipal water system, and may not kidnap A’s 
                                                 
3   Some of the foundational literature here includes Williamson, supra note 2;  and Benjamin Klein, Robert 
A. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, J. L. & Econ. (Oct. 1978). 
4 A variety of terms have been used by economists to refer to the phenomenon of outsourcing, including 
“vertical specialization,” “intra-product specialization,” and “global production sharing.”  For excellent 
starting points to explore this literature, see Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a 
Global Economy, 72 REV. ECON. STUD.135 (2005); Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and 
Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31 (1998). 
5  Certainly some of the international trade literature recognizes that the quality of foreign enforcement of 
contracts is an important factor in expaining whether a firm relies on international outsourcing to procure 
specialized inputs, rather than production within the firm, either domestically or through vertical 
integration.  See Barbara J. Spencer, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts, NBER Working 
Paper 11418 (2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11418 (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).  This 
literature focuses on the institutional conditions under which a country can attact global firms to enter into 
outsourcing contracts in that country, rather than focusing on decisions within the firm, as does the law and 
economics theory of the firm literature that we are describing here. 
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executives and hold them for ransom in order to get higher pay than the contract 
provides.  Nor will the contract have to specify that either firm A or firm B can call the 
other into court to settle any future dispute over terms of the contract.6  Those things are 
properly taken for granted, because both A and B will be subject to law, regulation, and 
customary norms operating in their respective countries. 
 By contrast, firms that organize production through a long chain of suppliers in a 
global marketplace might have to be concerned about such problems, as well as 
numerous other problems that arise in the absence of a sophisticated and well-developed 
legal and regulatory infrastructure.  At least three different literatures have touched on 
these problems:  a literature in law and economics has considered the importance of rule 
of law and property rights protection generally to economic development7; another 
literature has focused on the problem of regulating environmental and social behavior of 
corporations in the global context8;  and the theories of the firm literature in law and 
                                                 
6  The contract may specify such things as which courts the parties will go to, which law will be applied, 
and whether the parties may have to submit to arbitration first.  See, e.g., Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Corporations and the Market for Law, Working Paper dated Feb. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.ssrn.org.  But as long as the parties are willing to accept the default rules, the contract may 
leave these details out. 
7 See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE(1990); 
for a good summary of this literature, plus classics such as Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government,  15(1) J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 222  (Apr. 
1999);  Dani Rodrik, Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are And How To Acquire Them, 
2370 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2000). 
8   This literature began with discussions amongst academics in both law and business about corporate 
social responsibility and the difficulty of regulating corporate behavior across national boundaries.  For 
some introductions to voluminous literature, see, e.g,  R. Edward Freeman, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979).  Recently, attention has turned more broadly to what one group of scholars has 
called “global administrative law,” which is the term coined by  Profs. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, 
Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener to describe the “rapidly changing pattern of transnational 
regulation and its administration.”  Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. 
Wiener, Foreword: Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to 
Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2005). The conceptual 
construct of global administrative law includes both the development of new, pluralistic legal regimes, 
including regimes that regulate the social and environmental conditions of production, and also 
enforcement of these regimes.  Moreover, the global administrative law project seeks to evaluate the 
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economics has considered the standard problems of coordination, communication, and 
incentive structures in the “make or buy” decision.9  In the latter case, the literature has 
generally assumed that various parties contract with each other “in the shadow of the 
law.”10   There is also a relevant literature on the development, outside the law, of norms, 
reputational constraints, and arbitration mechanisms that may substitute for law in some 
circumstances.11 
 In this article we examine the rapid emergence and expansion of a private-sector 
compliance and enforcement infrastructure that we believe may increasingly be providing 
a substitute for public legal and regulatory infrastructure in global commerce, especially 
in developing countries where rule of law is weak and court systems are absent or 
inadequate.  This infrastructure is provided by a proliferation of performance codes and 
standards (some developed in collaborative processes by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and business), and a rapidly-growing global army of privately-trained and 
authorized inspectors and certifiers that we call the “third-party assurance industry.”    
 Third-party assurance in some form or another has been used to facilitate 
commerce for centuries.12  But its growth in very recent years has been phenomenal.13  
                                                                                                                                                 
legitimacy of these new law-making regimes according to such fundamental values of democracy as 
accountability, transparency, consent, and participation of the governed. 
9 See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 3. 
10 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L. J. 950 (1979); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
11   See generally Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV.. 2328 (2004) (giving an overview of contract 
enforcement by firms, courts and reputation; establishing a model for choosing contract enforcement 
mechanisms); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Codes’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa 
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms 
and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: 
Evidence on the Maghribu Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST (1989). 
12 The earliest use of third party assurance services may have been the role played by several “boards of 
state accountants” in verifying state revenues and expenditures in ancient Athens, 500 to 300 B.C.  See 
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Moreover, whereas the third-party assurance business first developed to facilitate the 
making and carrying out of private contracts, we claim that the activities of the assurance 
industry are rapidly being deployed for purposes that in the past would be considered 
“public” and “regulatory” in nature, and would previously have been left to the authority 
of government.  Third-party assurance may thus be providing a substitute for both private 
and public law in a number of situations, and may even be providing a new institutional 
structure through which private commercial exchange may be regulated for essentially 
public purposes.    
 We examine the new prominence of this industry in international commerce and 
the reasons why it has exploded onto the scene in the last decade.  We also consider 
whether the rapid deployment of third-party assurance in business is facilitating the 
transmission of global norms of acceptable business behavior to new parts of the world, 
or whether, by providing a substitute for law, it is undermining the indigenous 
development of sophisticated legal systems. 
 
I.  The third party assurance industry and evidence of its growth. 
 Perhaps the most familiar type of third-party assurance service is the external 
auditor, who examines financial statements and the processes by which they were 
generated, and opines on whether the statements fairly and accurately reflect the 
underlying economic reality.14  Independent external auditors have been critical to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
George J Costouros, Auditing in the Athenian State of the Golden Age (500-300 B.C.), ACCT. HISTORIAN’S 
J. 41, 41-50 (Spring 1978). 
13 See section I below for evidence of an explosion in recent years in demand for third-party assurance 
services, as well as for the development of quantifiable performance metrics by which such services can 
measure and report on performance by parties to actual and potential contracts. 
14  According to the Global Market Information Database by Euromonitor International, the size of the US 
market for accountants’ services has grown by 9.6% from 2000 to 2004, measured in the dollar value of 
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development of liquid financial markets in which individuals may invest in market-traded 
securities issued by the businesses with reasonable confidence that the information the 
company has provided is an accurate reflection of the condition of the underlying 
business. 
 Financial institutions that invest in or insure business ventures have also long 
made use of other kinds of assurance services, in addition to financial audits.  The 
business of assuring and attesting to non-financial matters began at least 150 years ago, 
for example, when marine insurance companies in France, Britain, and Italy began hiring 
inspectors to make sure that ships being hired for international commerce were sea-
worthy.15  And financial institutions generally, including insurance companies and 
lending institutions, continue to be among the most active users of a variety of third-party 
assurance services.16 
A.  The impact of ISO.  A major contributor to the development of a global 
assurance service industry has been the widespread adoption since the mid-20th century 
of international standards and technical specifications for a vast array of products and 
processes.  Since its founding in 1946, the International Organization for Standardization  
                                                                                                                                                 
sales. Auditing and accounting services was the largest sector, accounting for 59.7% of sales in 2004. The 
UK market has grown by 12% from 2000 to 2004.  As an indication of the explosion in demand for audit 
services in developing countries, by contrast, he Chinese market for accountants’ services has grown by 
304.5% over the years from 1999 to 2003. The market is predicted to expand by 149% to $4,022 million by 
2008. Auditing took the largest share in China in 2003, accounting for 66.2 %. See  
http://www.euromonitor.com/.  
15  RINA (Registro Italiano Navale) is an assurance firm that  has provided ship classification and 
certification services since its establishment in 1861. See http://www.rina.it/.   Since global trade and 
insurance predated RINA, we suspect ship inspection services did too.  Hence our claim that the business 
goes back “at least” that far.  Intertek started its maritime survey business in 1885. See 
http://www.intertek.com/.  http://bpa.odu.edu/port/research/REGULATORYISSUES.doc. )A number of 
firms that are currently active in international inspection and assurance services, including RINA, SGS, 
BVQI, the TÜVs (Technischer  Überwachungsverein), Intertek, and DNV (Det Norske Veritas), had their 
origins as firms that inspected ships, and/or their cargo, for international trade.  See discussion in Section II 
below. 
16  Familiar types of third-party assurance services used in financial transactions include auditing, credit 
rating, title services, inspections for hazardous materials such as asbestos, and appraisers. 
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(ISO) has promulgated thousands of technical standards.17  ISO also disseminates 
information about dozens of accreditation bodies that, in turn, accredit hundreds of 
organizations that are in the business of carrying out various evaluations to determine if 
products or processes or management systems are in conformance with the specifications 
in ISO standards. 
In 1987, the ISO embarked on a significant new path when it adopted the “ISO 
9000” standards of quality management.18  These were the first sets of international 
standards that applied to management systems that firms have in place to meet customer 
and applicable regulatory requirements, rather than to the characteristics of the products 
firms produce or to units and methods of measuring those characteristics.19  Although 
certification is not a requirement of the ISO standards, many firms have chosen to have 
their systems independently audited and certified to them,20 and certification rapidly 
“became a de facto requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the 
                                                 
17 “ISO”, from the Greek word for “equal,” was adopted as the “standardized” name for the organization 
whose English name is the International Organization for Standardization.  ISO is a non-governmental 
organization whose  member institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or are 
mandated by their government.  Typically, however, members have their roots in the private sector, having 
been set up by national partnerships of industry associations.  ISO uses technical committees organized by 
subjects for standards development, and at this time has more than 200 such committees.  Since its 
founding in 1947, ISO has published more than 16,000 product, technical, and performance standards for 
the characteristics and quality of raw materials and other tangible production inputs, ranging from 
agricultural products, grades of oil and gasoline, metals, ceramics and glues to electrical parts, 
nanotechnology, information processing, digital equipment, and so forth..  See 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html (last visited March 9, 2007).  ISO standards 
often form the basis for trade treaties and agreements.  For an excellent description of the role of ISO 
standards in international trade, and the process by which it promulgates standards, as well as an early 
recognition of what has come to be called new governance,  see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of 
Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the 
Environment,  22 ECOLOGY L. Q. 479, 489-491 (1995).  
18  Prior to publication of ISO 9000 standards, the ISO had focused largely on developing internationally 
applicable technical standards for products and materials.  ISO 9000 was established under the Technical 
Committee No. 176 (TC176).  The list of technical committees is available at  
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/tc/tclist/TechnicalCommitteeList.TechnicalCommitteeList (last 
visited August 14, 2006).  
19   See Roht-Arriaza, supra note  17, at 499. 
20  See The ISO Survey 2004, available at  http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-
services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf (last visited July 3, 2006.) 
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world,” as well as being actually required for certain products sold in Europe and the 
United States.21  
The ISO 9000 idea of creating standards for management systems has greatly 
fueled the development of the assurance industry.22   The organizations that were first 
qualified to certify ISO 9000 compliance were generally European organizations that 
were already providing quality inspection services for various products; more recently, 
accounting and audit firms have been expanding their business services portfolios to add 
capability to perform ISO 9000 certifications.23   
Although we have so far not found data tracking growth in the third-party 
inspection and assurance industry, data collected by ISO show that the number of firms 
and facilities in the world that were ISO 9000 certified grew from 27,816, in 48 countries 
in 1993,24 to 670,399 in 154 countries by 2004.25  ISO's approach to compiling these 
totals involves surveying the certifying bodies, so these numbers represent the total 
number of firms and sites that the certifying bodies claim to have certified.  ISO provides 
no comparable data on the number of active certifying bodies, but this dramatic 
expansion in the number of firms and plants that have been certified could only be 
accomplished if the number of people and firms doing certification work had also grown 
dramatically. 
                                                 
21   Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 500.    
22   See Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, 229, 261, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY (Richardson & Wood, eds) (2006).   
23  Organizations originally in financial auditing , such as KPMG Performance Registra Inc., a wholly 
owned subsidiary in Canada of KPMG, LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers in Canada , have extended their 
services to ISO certification. See http://www.kpmg.ca/en/ms/performanceregistrar/services.html  and 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/service.nsf/docid/5401765577527120852570CA001771D2  (last visited Aug. 
10, 2006). However, most of the certification bodies providing ISO9000 certification, including BVQI, UL, 
SGS-ICS, and the like, were already in the quality inspection services sector when the ISO 9000 standards 
were developed and promulgated. 
24  See  http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-14000/pdf/survey10thcycle.pdf; at p. 15. 
25   See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 10.  
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Once the demand for management quality certification had developed sufficiently 
to support a private sector infrastructure to certify management systems, it was only a 
small step for business, government, NGOs, and social activists to look to these same 
sorts of certifying organizations to provide assurance when asking companies to 
demonstrate that they are meeting specified criteria for social performance.26  In 1996, 
the ISO adopted the ISO 14000 series of standards for evaluating environmental 
management systems.27   By 2004, 90,569 facilities and firms, in 127 countries, had been 
certified as meeting these standards.28  And ISO is currently developing standards for 
social responsibility as well, although ISO asserts that these standards are not intended to 
be the basis for third-party certifications.29 
                                                 
26   The American National Standards Institute (which is the U.S. organizational representative to the ISO) 
notes growing pressures toward social performance certification on its website.  See  
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1   (“During the first years of the 21st 
Century, those involved in standards-setting activities clearly recognized a growing need for globally 
relevant standards and related conformity assessment mechanisms. ‘Market forces’ such as global trade and 
competition; societal issues such as health, safety and the environment; an enhanced focus on consumer 
needs and involvement and increasing interaction between public-sector and private-sector interests were 
significantly impacting standardization and conformity assessment programs. Standards themselves had 
expanded well beyond documents identifying product specifications to instead focus on performance issues 
and to also include processes, systems and personnel.”) 
27   See Reinhardt Peglau, Applauding the success of ISO 14001 should not deafen us to the challenges, 
ISO Management Systems, January/February, 2002, 15-16, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/en/iso9000-
14000/addresources/articles/pdf/viewpoint_1-02.pdf 
28 See http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf, at p. 20. 
29 See  
http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/3934883/3935096/home.html?nodeid=445125
9&vernum=0  (“The guidance standard will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000 and be voluntary to use. It 
will not include requirements and will thus not be a certification standard. 
 “There is a range of many different opinions as to the right approach ranging from strict legislation 
at one end to complete freedom at the other. We are looking for a golden middle way that promotes respect 
and responsibility based on known reference documents without stifling creativity and development.  
 “Our work will aim to encourage voluntary commitment to social responsibility and will lead to 
common guidance on concepts, definitions and methods of evaluation. 
 “The need for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially responsible 
way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. It is shared by the stakeholder groups that are 
participating in the WG SR [Working Group on Social Responsibility] to develop ISO 26000: industry, 
government, labour, consumers, nongovernmental organizations and others, in addition to geographical and 
gender-based balance.  
 “ISO has chosen SIS, Swedish Standards Institute and ABNT, Brazilian Association of Technical 
Standards to provide the joint leadership of the ISO WG SR.  The WG SR has been given the task of 
drafting an International Standard for social responsibility that will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000.” 
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 B.  An overview of assurance organizations 
In the past ten to fifteen years, as numerous corporations, NGOs, and other 
organizations have developed codes of practice for various industries, firms that have 
long been in the business of inspecting the quality, weight, and quantity of traded goods – 
especially those that evaluate and certify conformance with ISO standards – have quickly 
expanded to offer their services in auditing and certifying that firm operations satisfy 
other codes of practice.  Firms such as SGS, Intertek, DNV (Det Norske Veritas), BVQI, 
RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), and the TÜVs (Technischer  Überwachungsverein)  
have all been in business as inspectors of goods and ships in international trade since 
before 1900.  They all operate globally and have had a quasi-official status as inspectors 
for customs officials or government agencies regulating products moving in international 
markets.  All have recently expanded their business to do audits and inspections to verify 
compliance with social responsibility standards.30 
 In addition, dozens of new firms have entered the business as certification bodies, 
including firms like Cal Safety Compliance Corp. (CSCC), ALGI, and Hong Kong 
Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA).  CSCC, for example, is a division of Specialized 
Technology Resources, Inc. in Los Angeles.  It was established in 1991 to provide social 
responsibility auditing services, initially in the garment sector and now in a broad range 
                                                 
30  BVQI was formed in 1988 in response to the demand for the independent certification of ISO 9000 
Quality Management Systems, primarily providing management systems certification, product certification, 
and service certification. See http://www.bvqi.com/. DNV, established in 1864, primarily focuses on risk 
management certification and consulting, in particular for maritime, oil and gas, process and transportation 
industries. See http://www.dnv.com/. Intertek can be traced to three separate companies in 1885, including 
Thomas Edison’s Lamp Testing Bureau.  It initially provided maritime surveying  and testing of electrical 
equipment; it now provides testing services  and risk management for. a  wide range of businesses.  See 
http://www.intertek.com/. RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), a company established in 1861 in Genova, has 
been providing ship classification and certification services since its establishment. See http://www.rina.it/. 
SGS, originally founded in 1878 in Rouen as a French grain shipment inspection house and later registered 
in Geneva in 1919, provides inspection services of traded goods, product testing services, and certification 
services for products, systems or services. See www.sgs.com/.  
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of industries including home furnishings, food and agriculture, cosmetics, toys, and high-
tech products, and has operations in more than 110 countries.  Similarly, ALGI, 
headquartered in Nyack, NY, was founded in 1994 by several former Department of 
Labor officials to do social accountability auditing.  TransFair USA was launched in 
1998 and began "fair trade" certification of coffee purchased from developing countries 
in 1999.  It has since expanded to certification of other food products.  HKQA was 
established in 1989 by the Hong Kong government to do social compliance audits.  
 C.  The ”professionalization” of the inspection industry. 
 The assurance business is itself largely unregulated, and there are no well-
established and well-accepted training procedures or professional standards for those who 
“audit” non-financial performance indicators.  Yet, by its nature it is a business that is rife 
with potential for abuse.  This is because, as is true for financial audits, inspections and 
evaluations of systems and operating practices are usually arranged and purchased by a 
supplier company in order to provide assurance to a purchasing company that the supplier 
has met contract terms, or complied with certain norms and standards.  And, as is true in 
the business of providing financial audits, individual auditors might have incentives to 
accept payoffs in exchange for approval by the auditors.  Likewise, the client firms whose 
facilities are being audited might have incentives to offer such payoffs if it is cheaper for 
them to make the side payments than it is to comply with the codes or standards.  Indeed, 
factory owners in developing countries who are being asked by their developed-country 
customers to subject themselves to audit, frequently complain that the demands for audits 
are a form of extortion.31 
                                                 
31  See, e.g., Dexter Roberts, Pete Engardio, Aaron Bernstein, Stanley Holmes, & Xiang Ji, Secrets, Lies, 
and Sweatshops, BUS. WK., Nov. 27, 2006, at 42 (Opening paragraphs tell the story of Tang Yinghong, a 
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 Suppliers of financial auditing services long ago figured out that there are two 
basic mechanisms for addressing this problem:  professionalization of the providers of the 
service, and investments by the providers in reputations for honesty.  Professional 
accountants are now required to go through formal training and licensing by 
organizations representing accountants, and they typically organize themselves into large, 
high-visibility firms with substantial interest in maintaining a reputation for honesty, 
independence, and competence.  Those firms, in turn, have incentives to see to it that 
their auditors are competent, disciplined and behave in professional ways. 
 These things are only beginning to happen in the nonfinancial assurance business.  
Although the leading international firms in the business, such as SGS, Intertek, DNV, 
BVQI, RINA, and the TÜVs, mentioned above, have substantial reputational capital at 
risk, many smaller, newer assurance firms are in the business that may not yet have 
established reputations.  Moreover, there is only one significant professional organization 
that offers any standardization and assurance of the assurance professionals themselves.  
This is the International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA), a UK organization 
based in London that was founded in 1984 as part of a UK government initiative to 
establish and certify quality standards.32  IRCA certifies auditors of management systems, 
and approves training organizations and certifies their auditor training courses, and 
claims to have certified more than 13,750 auditors in over 120 countries worldwide.33 
Generally, however, there is “very little oversight” over the assurance industry.34 
                                                                                                                                                 
manager at a Chinese factory that was due to be inspected for Wal-Mart, when an alleged inspector from an 
organization calling itself “Shanghai Corporate Responsibility Management & Consulting Co. called the 
manager and said that “for a $5000 fee, he’d take care of Tang’s Wal-Mart problem.  ‘He promised us he 
could definitely get us a pass for the audit,’ Tang said.”) 
32 See http://www.irca.org/about/ (last visited March 9, 2007). 
33 Id. 
34   Wood, supra note 22, at 199 n. 173. 
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II.  Factors causing a rapid growth in demand for third party assurance 
services. 
A number of different factors seem to be at work that, together, are driving the 
extraordinary growth in demand for assurance services, and in the supply of businesses 
that are offering their services as inspectors and auditors to meet this demand. 
 A.  The rapid opening of international markets in the last two decades, 
accompanied by increased reliance on outsourcing, the lengthening of supply chains, and 
the extension of supply chains into all parts of the globe. 
 Other scholars have written at length about the growth in international commerce 
in the last few decades,35 and the extent to which corporations in developed countries 
now contract with developing country firms for parts manufacturing, assembly, testing, 
and even sales (e.g., call centers) and record-keeping.36  When products are made in 
factories owned by, and under the immediate supervision of managerial employees of a 
large firm, that firm can directly implement its own quality, timely delivery, labor, and 
environmental operating norms and standards.  When the same firm contracts with a 
factory owner in Bangladesh, or Vietnam, or Costa Rica to make the products, the parties 
to the contract will probably need to develop alternative mechanisms, other than direct 
managerial control, to make certain that the products are still made according to the 
hiring firm's specifications (both as to product characteristics and quality, and as to the 
                                                 
35 The international trade literature in particular tracks this growth. See e.g., International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, Market Access for Developing Countries' Exports, (2001) (discussing  the international 
trade growth from 1960s to 2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/madc/eng/042701.htm; 
OECD, OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services: Detailed by Partner Country 2000-2003 
(2006). 
36  See, e.g, George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, working draft dated Aug. 
6, 2006, available at http://www.ssrn.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Steve Lohr, Outsourcing Is Climbing 
Skills Ladder, N.Y.TIMES, Feb.16, 2006. 
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processes used).  These mechanisms may range from the hiring firm having its own 
inspectors in the contractor’s plant at all times, to having third party inspectors check the 
plant's operations from time to time, to relying solely on inspection of the final product at 
the time the hiring firm takes possession of it.  This last mechanism may be widely-used 
for simple commodity-type products made in uncontroversial ways.  But, as we discuss 
below, such products represent a decreasing share of total trade. 
 B.  The growing complexity of products and increased division of labor within 
supply chains. 
 More of the products being exchanged between firms in international markets are 
intermediate products that must meet strict specifications as inputs or components of 
other products, or are made utilizing processes that are controversial (e.g., strip mining, 
farming with patented seeds and fertilizers and pest control chemicals, or labor-intensive 
assembly potentially involving sweatshop conditions or child labor).37 It is common, for 
example, for products to be designed in one country, components to be purchased from 
suppliers in other countries, assembly work done in yet another country, all for shipment 
to markets in a number of other countries.38 
                                                 
37    See FRAGMENTATION: NEW PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Sven W. Arndt & 
Henryk Kierzkowski, eds) (2001).  For a thoughtful analysis of various controversies involving the 
processes by which products are made and the implications of those controversies for various bodies of law 
(such as international trade law; domestic environmental, health and safety regulations; and constitutional 
analysis of companies’ statements about how their products are made), see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences 
for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118  HARV. L. 
REV. 525 (2004). 
38  See Grossman & Helpman,  supra note 13, at 136.  Quoting an example from the 1998 Annual Report of 
the WTO concerning the production of a particular “American” car, Grossman and Helpman state:  
Thirty per cent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and 
advanced technology, 7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 
2.5% to the United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland for data 
processing. This means that only 37% of the production value …is generated in the United States 
(p.36)).  
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 At each step of the way, the corporations that are organizing all of this productive 
activity need to be able to control for quality, conformance to specifications, timely 
delivery of intermediate products to final assembly plants, and safety in both the 
manufacturing and use of the product.  Throughout this process, inventories must be 
managed for cost-efficiency, and to provide required levels of customer service.39  For 
such products, the purchasing company may have compelling reason to want to monitor 
steps in the production process in one way or another. 
 C.  The growing need by global corporations for assurance that firms they are 
contracting with can meet requirements for quality, and timely delivery. 
 The surge in demand from global corporations for third party assurance has grown 
out of the need on the part of global buyers to be sure that, if they were going to 
outsource an activity to smaller, less-experienced firms in distant countries, those firms 
could meet quality standards and timely delivery commitments.  That need was the 
impetus for the development of the ISO 9000 standards for assuring that organizations 
could meet product quality expectations, discussed above.40   
The growth of the third-party assurance industry based on ISO standard-setting 
was further fueled by developments in the regulation of international trade.  Efforts in 
Europe to facilitate intra-European trade by harmonizing regulatory requirements  
initially emphasized compliance with European technical standards as a necessary 
condition for selling any goods in Europe.41   Thus, the standards developed by the 
European standard-setting agency, the Comite Europeen de Normalization (CEN), were 
                                                 
39 See e.g., PHILIP B. SCHARY AND TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, MANAGING THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN (1998); 
BIRGIT DAM JESPERSEN, TAGE SKJOTT-LARSEN, SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(2005); JAMES B. AYRES, HANDBOOK OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT (2001).  
40 Since the publication of the original ISO 9000 standards, subsequent updates have been published as ISO 
9001,9002, and so forth.   
41   See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 17, at 492. 
 16
applied to any goods sold in Europe.  This led non-European companies to argue that 
technical and other standards, such as for quality and  product safety, should be 
developed by the international standard-setting process of the ISO, rather than through a 
European process.42  That position was persuasive to negotiators developing the GATT 
1994/WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which thus provides that where 
international standards for technical requirements exist, member states should use those 
standards as the basis for their own technical requirements.43  As a consequence, ISO 
certification became necessary for a growing number of products, and as ISO standards 
expanded beyond technical specifications to quality and environmental management 
systems, a “huge industry of auditors, certifiers and accreditation bodies has emerged to 
serve these expanding certification needs.”44 
 D.  The growing need by global corporations for assurance that firms they are 
contracting with can meet requirements for workplace safety, acceptable labor and 
human rights performance, and acceptable environmental standards, as well as quality 
and on-time delivery.  
 In the last decade, for reasons we discuss below, many global corporations have 
begun seeking assurance that firms they do business with can meet social and 
environmental standards, in addition to technical and quality standards.45  This focus on 
                                                 
42   See id.  
43   See id at 494-95, citing the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, . Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.4, reprinted in H.R. 
Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1428 (1994).  
44  Wood, supra note 22, at 261.  Prof. Wood includes companies’ interests in demonstrating conformance 
with various voluntary codes of environmental performance and  negotiated standards involving 
governments and polluters; as well as ISO 14001 environmental management systems, as having provided 
the impetus for the rapid expansion of the “huge industry” of third-party certifiers, auditors and 
accreditation bodies.  
45 One indication of the new attention by business firms to social and environmental performance is the 
publication in early 2007 of the first edition of the CSR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES DIRECTORY, which lists 
443 organizations worldwide under 49 different service categories, with contact details and summaries of 
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social and environmental standards is being driven partly by pressure on companies by 
some investors.  Certain sectors of the investment community, such as public pension 
funds and self-described “SRI investors” (for “socially responsible investors”) in the EU, 
UK and US, and insurance investors in the UK, are increasingly looking at the social and 
environmental performance of their portfolio companies and those companies’ trading 
partners in an attempt to identify risks associated with the portfolio firms as well as their 
trading partners out in the supply chain.46   This development, in turn, is causing 
corporations in developing countries that may be suppliers to more well-known global 
corporations to insist that their suppliers, in turn, also meet certain standards. 
 In this way, multinational firms may be drawing more small and local firms in 
more countries into their orbit.  As this happens, we are observing a movement toward 
global standard setting and the associated use of third-party assurance firms to certify that 
standards are being met, even by supplier firms that still operate and sell primarily in 
their home country.47  As we discuss at greater length below, we suspect this chain of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the services they offer to assist corporations in meeting so-called “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) 
norms and standards  See 
http://www.ethicalperformance.com/csrdirectory/index.php?PHPSESSID=c78e0151641014186bd7a2fa9d3
05c49  (last visited Jan. 19, 2007).  
46 See, e.g., Daniel Brooksbank, Norwegian Government Fund Excludes Wal-Mart, IPE.com, June 6, 2006 
(Reporting on announcement by Norwegian Government Pension Fund that it had divested its holdings in 
Wal-Mart on the grounds that the fund would "incur an unacceptable risk of contributing to serious or 
systematic violations of human rights by maintaining its investments in the company.").  Another example 
is the Association of British Insurers in London, which represents 94% of UK insurers.  Insurance 
companies in the UK offer savings and investment products in addition to insurance, and control 17% of all 
UK company publicly-listed equity.  See 
http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Key%20facts%202005_LR.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2007)  The ABI published guidelines in 2002, 2005, and 2007 identifying the kinds of social and 
environmental management systems and factual disclosure that its members expect to see discussed on  an 
annual basis so that, as investors, they can mitigate the risks in their investment portfolios.  See text 
accompanying notes 73-75, infra.   
47 Suzanne Konzelmann, Frank Wilkinson, Charles Craypo and Rabih Aridi, The Export of National 
Varieties of Capitalism:  The Cases of Wal-Mart and IKEA, Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 314, September, 2005, at 18, argue that IKEA, for example, is transferring 
its standards for quality, efficiency, and socially responsible behavior “globally to the mutual benefit of all 
the system’s stakeholder groups” by implementing its “IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing 
Products (IWAY) throughout its global supply chain.”  To implement its standards, “IKEA contracts with 
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events is becoming an important mechanism by which developed-country business 
standards and norms are being propagated worldwide.48   
 1.  Recognition of the risks to global brands from problems in the supply chains. 
 Global corporations are also more inclined in the last two decades to insist that 
suppliers, as well as their own facilities, meet certain social standards because they 
recognize that each link in the supply chain potentially exposes the whole operation to 
risks associated with that link. 
 The experience of companies in the chemical industry (especially companies 
operating in Canada), illustrate the pattern.  Canadian chemical firms recognized as long 
ago as 1983 that risks in the handling of hazardous wastes in foreign operations can affect 
reputation and profitability of their worldwide organizations.  To address these risks, a 
group of chemical companies led by Dow Canada and the Canadian Chemical Producers 
Association (CCPA), with encouragement from the Canadian government, agreed to 
develop a set of safe operating principles.49  The 1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant 
in Bhopal, India, accelerated the development and adoption of these principles, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
independent auditors to inspect and monitor all suppliers with whom the company does business on an on-
going basis,” according to Konzelmann, et. al., at 19. 
48  British Petroleum and Shell, for example, are imposing requirements on smaller companies that provide 
maritime services to raise their standards for health, environment and safety and to secure certification of 
having met those higher standards.  Interview with Anne-Maree O’Connor, Core Ratings (Member of the 
DNV Group), London, June 26, 2006 (notes on file with authors). See also Michael P. Vandenberg, The 
Wal-Mart Effect:  The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, Vanderbilt University Law 
School Working Paper (2006), available at http://www.ssrn.org. 
That supply chain pressures can affect the standards of conduct expected of companies is 
consistent with the legal transplant literature.  See, e.g.,  Johnathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal 
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and  Argentine Examples to Explain  the Transplant Process, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003)(categorizing types of legal transplants; one of which is the externally-
dictated transplant; where a foreign individual or entity may require adoption of certain laws as a condition 
for doing business). 
49  See J. Arthur O’Conner, Responsible Care:  Doing the Right Thing, Canada’s Chemical Producers:  
Chemistry – a part of everyday life/Responsible Care, 
http://www.ccpa.ca/files/Library/Documents/RC/Doing_the_Right_Thing_history_of_RC.doc (last visited 
June 22, 2006). 
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came to be called the Responsible Care Initiative (RCI), as other chemical companies 
joined the initiative in an effort to improve the industry’s reputation.50 
 The initiative originally included six standards for safe practice in chemical 
production, transport and control.51  Although the standards had been adopted by 
numerous chemical companies by 1988,52 by 1993, chemical firms were learning, as 
Responsible Care executive Brian Wastle explained to us, that the mere fact that “CEOs 
stated they had met their commitment meant nothing to an untrusting public.”53  So the 
standards were expanded to include provision for verification and ongoing improvement 
of performance.54 
 Responsible Care executive Wastle reports that the standards now require that 
“teams of industry experts, public advocates and local citizens,” review each company 
every three years, and “write a consensus report summarizing the verification process and 
players, opportunities for improvement, findings, required corrective action and 
successful practices,” with verification certificates awarded once the work is completed.55 
                                                 
50 See Jean M. Bélanger, Responsible Care in Canada:  The Evolution of an Ethic and a Commitment, 27 
CHEM. INT’L. 2, March-April, 2005, http://www.iupac.org/publications/ci/2005/2702/1_belanger.html (last 
visited June 22, 2006) . 
51   The six categories of the original standards included 1) Community awareness and emergency response; 
2) Research and development;  3) Manufacturing;  4) Transportation;  5) Distribution; and 6)  Hazardous 
waste management.  See Canada’s Chemical Producers:  Chemistry – a part of everyday life/Responsible 
Care, http://www.ccpa.ca/ResponsibleCare/ (last visited June 22, 2006).  
52  Chemical companies that were part of the original Responsible Care Initiative include Dow Chemical 
Canada, ICI subsidiary CIL, Union Carbide Canada, Imperial Oil Chemicals, H.L. Blachford, Rhone-
Poulenc Canada, Ethyl Canada, Rohm & Haas Canada, Hoescht Celanese, General Chemical, Allied 
Chemicals, Shell (chemical division), Cyanamide Canada, and Polysar.  Email from Brian Wastle, Vice 
President, Responsible Care®, Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association, Ottowa Ontario, June 22, 2006. 
53  Id. 
54 Under the heading “Other Aspects of Responsible Care,” the RC code now includes the following:  “The 
ultimate test of Responsible Care is whether it delivers improved performance.  On an ongoing basis, 
CCPA member companies must track, improve and report to their publics how they are performing in all 
the aspects of health, safety, environmental and social performance that are important to those publics.  
CCPA collects, collates and publishes data from all companies that our critics have told us they are 
particularly interested in.  These include chemical emissions and wastes, with five-year projections, 
employee injuries and illnesses, chemical process spills and fires and transportation accidents.”  Id. 
55  Id. 
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 Similarly, firms that use highly labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly 
processes, such as apparel and toy manufacturers, have responded to media attacks on 
firms whose products were allegedly made in "sweatshop" conditions 56 by developing 
codes of practice for their own factories and for supplier factories.  But these firms have 
also learned that announcing codes of practice is not sufficient to solve the problem57 – 
they must also develop implementation strategies and arrange for inspection and 
certification to be sure the codes are in fact implemented. 
 To enhance brand protection by tackling the implementation problem in one 
industry, for example, a group of corporations in the apparel and “sewn products” 
industries, together with industry trade associations,58 provided seed money and technical 
support to form a third-party standard-setting organization called WRAP (Worldwide 
Responsible Apparel Production) in the late 1990s, with the goal of establishing worker 
                                                 
56  The iconic examples here include the negative publicity in the late 1990’s surrounding sweatshop 
working conditions in manufacturing plants making Nike products and Kathy Lee Gifford brand apparel for 
Wal-Mart. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1285-86 &  fns. 441-3 (1999) (discussing press concerning Nike 
and Kathy Lee Gifford examples).  See also KARL SCHOENBERGER, LEVI’S CHILDREN: COMING TO TERMS 
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 58-65 (2000) (discussing sweatshop allegations 
concerning Nike, Kathy Lee Gifford and Wal-Mart and the resulting negative press).     
57  Wal-Mart has posted 10 "Guiding Ethical Principles" on its website, and states that it periodically 
inspects its factories for implementation, and yet continues to come under fire for tolerating poor working 
conditions in supplier factories.  See, e.g., Konzelmann, et.al., supra note 47, at  21-22 (reporting on studies 
of Wal-Mart’s labor practices, state-level sanctions for “repeated violations of child safety ordinances, 
wage and hour regulations and anti-discrimination mandates,” and lawsuits alleging wide-spread practice of 
forced “off-the-clock” work).  See also Brooksbank, supra note 46 (expressing the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund’s view that continued investment in WalMart would “contribute to serious or systematic 
violations of human rights”);  and Steven Greenhouse and Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade:  
Sweatshops in Jordan, N. Y.TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1 (reporting on a study by the National Labor 
Committee finding substandard conditions and abuse of employees at more than 25 out of 100 apparel 
factories in Jordan, including factories that supply Wal-Mart and Jones Apparel).  Immediately after the 
National Labor Committee study findings were released Democrats in Congress pledged to introduce 
legislation to prohibit import or sale of goods made under conditions that violate core International Labor 
Organization worker rights standards, illustrating one of the risks global corporations face if they do not 
successfully enforce adequate labor practices at factories from which they buy product.  See Kristi Ellis, 
House Democrats Ask Bush to Investigate Jordan Abuse, WWD.COM, May 4, 2006. 
58  In 1998, several prominent U.S. apparel producers approached the American Apparel Manufacturers 
Association (which subsequently merged with the Footwear Industries of American and the Fashion 
Association to form the American Apparel and Footwear Association) to work collaboratively to develop 
and implement labor, health, safety and environmental standards at the factory level.  See WRAP website at 
http://www.wrapapparel.org/ (last visited June 21, 2006). 
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safety and human rights performance standards to be applied at the factory level, and to 
implement inspection and certification procedures.59  WRAP is now formally an 
independent non-profit organization, governed by a board of directors of which, by the 
organization’s bylaws, more than half must be unaffiliated with the apparel industry.60  
Factory certification by WRAP requires that the facilities meet initial standards, as 
certified by an approved independent monitor, and be subject to unannounced audits, and 
annual renewal.61   
 The awareness of supply-chain risks is amplified by recognition on the part of 
corporations and their investors that a large share of the economic value that firms create 
is tied to their “brand value.”62  But, as discussed above, brand value is only as good as 
its weakest link because expansion in international travel and communications makes it 
harder for firms to hide their "dirty laundry.”  Wal-Mart, for example, has undertaken a 
massive public-relations campaign, including drawing attention to its new code of ethics, 
to attempt to respond to critics who charge that its suppliers violate international labor 
                                                 
59 The first result of the AAMA initiative was the twelve Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production 
Principles -- standards of labor practices, factory conditions, and environmental and customs compliance. 
The AAMA Board of Directors publicly endorsed these principles in 1998. For the next two years, the 
Association worked with producers, public interest groups, and development agencies to “design a process 
and develop an organization to monitor and certify factories for compliance—in hundreds of details—with 
the principles.”Statement of AAMA Board of Directors, available at 
http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Congent&pa=whowpage&pid=26 (last visited June 21, 
2006)  The fruit of this work was the incorporation of WRAP in 2000 as a "501 [c] 6" organization. Id. 
60  See http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=5. One of us (Blair) 
has served as an independent board member of WRAP since 2005. 
61 The organization is working to obtain commitments from apparel firms and retailers that products that 
carry certain brands must be made in factories that are certified.  Dara O’Rourke, Global Economic 
Governance Programme Working Paper 2005/16, Dept. of Politics and International Relations, Oxford 
University, describes and compares six major international programs that provide what he calls “non-
governmental regulation” in the apparel and sewn products industries, including WRAP, Social 
Accountability International (SA8000) (discussed below), Fair Labor Association, Ethical Trading 
Initiative, Fair Wear Foundation, and Worker Rights Consortium. 
62  A 1999 study by Stanford economist Robert Hall found that less than one-third of the market value of 
corporate financial claims in that year could be attributed to the value of physical assets owned by 
corporations, suggesting that the rest of the value was tied to intangible assets such as brand value.  See 
Robert E. Hall, E-Capital:  The Link between the Stock Market and the Labor Market in the 1990s, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (2000). 
 22
norms.63  Although its code notably lacks both specifics about standards of treatment for 
workers, and enforcement mechanisms, Wal-Mart may very well not be the worst 
offender among U.S. retailers in its tolerance of labor abuses in supplier factories.  But 
because of the high visibility of its brand, it is believed to be very influential in 
establishing industry norms, and hence may be targeted more intensely by NGOs and 
other activists than smaller, less well-known firms. 
  2.  The increasing sophistication of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), activists, and institutional investors in pressuring corporations to pay attention 
to environmental issues or human rights or labor concerns, and in publicizing failures in 
these areas. 
 As corporations find themselves in the glare of the NGO spotlight for their social 
and environmental practices, a growing number of firms are looking for better ways to 
make sure they know what is actually happening out in their supply chains.  Moreover, 
activists and investors are increasingly asking corporations to provide information about 
their social performance.  This, in turn, has created demand for services of firms that can 
                                                 
63   Wal-Mart's website notes that its "Global Ethics Office" was established in June, 2004, and, on June 4, 
2004, according to the website, "Wal-Mart released a revised Global Statement of Ethics to communicate 
our ethical standards to all Wal-Mart facilities and stakeholders. The Global Ethics Office provides 
guidance in making ethical decisions based on the Global Statement of Ethics and a process for anonymous 
reporting of suspected ethics violation. . . "  Wal-Mart's principles are: 
1. Follow the law at all times. 
2. Be honest and fair  
3. Never manipulate, misrepresent, abuse or conceal information  
4. Avoid conflicts of interest between work and personal affairs  
5. Never discriminate against anyone  
6. Never act unethically – even if someone else instructs you to do so  
7. Never ask someone to act unethically  
8. Seek assistance if you have questions about the Statement of Ethics or if you face an ethical 
dilemma  
9. Cooperate with any investigation of a possible ethics violation  




audit the quality of the non-financial information being produced.  Some major 
accounting firms, such as KPMG and PricewaterhousCoopers, have recently established 
global sustainability practice groups, for example, with the specialized expertise 
necessary to attest to environmental and social data.64   
 The activism of NGOs is accompanied by a proliferation of social and 
environmental responsibility standards over the past ten years,.  These initiatives have 
been developed by states; public/private partnerships; multi-stakeholder negotiation 
processes; industries and companies; institutional investors; functional groups such as 
accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of which did not exist 
more than about five years ago); NGOs; and non-financial ratings agencies.65 
   One example (among many) is Social Accountability 8000 (“SA 8000"), a 
project of Social Accountability International.  SA 8000 is an auditable certification 
standard based on international labor and human rights standards.66  SA8000 also 
provides a social accountability management system to guide firms in implementing 
standards and to demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standards.  In particular, to 
                                                 
64  See  KPMG Sustainability Services, available at http://www.kpmg.nl/site.asp?Id=40378  (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2007);  Price Waterhouse/Coopers Sustainability Practice Website, available at 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/challenges.nsf/docid/58E92287890B5314852570980064ACC2 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2007). 
65 The implications of these standards for theories of corporate governance, regulation, and economic 
development are profound, some of which one of the authors has explored in prior work.  See John M. 
Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: The Theory and Practice of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third 
Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORN. INT’L. J. J. 493(2005); 
Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 J. OF INT’L. 
L. & POLITICS 457 (2004). 
66 This standard is a voluntary, universal standard for companies interested in auditing and certifying labor 
practices in their facilities and those of their suppliers and vendors, based on the principles of international 
human rights norms as described in International Labour Organisation conventions, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It measures the 
performance of companies in eight key areas: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, free association 
and collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation.  See 
Overview of SA8000, available at http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last visited August 10, 2006). 
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meet SA 8000 standards requires third-party certification of individual production 
facilities such as factories or farms, based upon an inspection by SAI-approved inspectors 
and other third party inspectors.  Corporations that seek SA 8000 stamp of approval must 
stipulate in written purchase contracts with all suppliers that those suppliers conform to 
the SA 8000 standards.67 
 In addition to apparel and chemicals, discussed above, a number of other 
industries have promulgated voluntary corporate social responsibility standards that 
incorporate third-party certification that products being sold have been produced, 
harvested or extracted according to the standards, such as certification of conflict-free 
diamonds;68 sustainable fisheries69 and forestry;70  and fair-trade goods such as coffee, 
                                                 
67 Social Accountability 8000: 2001, International Standards, available at  
http://ce35.citysoft.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=document.showDocumentByID&nodeID=1&DocumentID=
136 (last visited July 2, 2006). 
68 See The Kimberly Process, available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080.  The Kimberly Process 
is a joint government, international diamond industry and civil society initiative to ensure that shipments of 
diamonds are free of “conflict diamonds” that have been sold to support wars in such countries as Angola, 
Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.  Id.   The Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme requires participating governments to implement import/export controls and systems 
to track diamonds from mining through export.  Rough diamonds exported with a Kimberly Process 
Certificate must be in sealed containers, and participating countries must set up systems to ensure that 
rough diamonds cannot be exported except in sealed containers with Certificates.   See 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www_docs/related_docs1/kp_review_final_report_-
_english_(jan_31).pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).  All significant diamond producing and trading centers, 
with the exception of Liberia, are now operating within the framework of the Kimberly Process.  Id. at 19. 
Review of the systems countries have implemented is delegated to multi-stakeholder teams composed of 
industry, government and civil society participants, with results being delivered to the Kimberly Process 
Working Group on Monitoring. 
69   See, e.g., the Marine Stewardship Council certification process, available at http://www.msc.org:  The 
Marine Stewardship Council is a global non-profit that has created an environmental standard for well-
managed fisheries, according to which third-party certifiers can grant labels that assure that fish have been 
grown in well-managed fisheries, or caught according to environmentally sustainable principles. See 
http://www.msc.org/html/content_462.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).  As with many of the certification 
schemes for products, an important part of the certification is of “chain of custody” procedures that attempt 
to ensure the value of the certified label.  See id.  The third-party certifiers that have been accredited are 
Scientific Certification Systems, SGS Product and Process Certifiers, Moody Marine Ltd., and OIA. 
70  See Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/fscprinciples.html.  The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an 
international body composed of industry participants, transnational environmental NGOs and social justice 
NGOs, strongly influenced by international standard setting processes at the ISO, and which accredits 
organizations to certify timber and forest products as meeting the FSC standard for sustainable forest 
management.  See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case 
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tea, cocoa and cotton.71  Thousands of individual companies have adopted voluntary 
codes of conduct establishing their standards for responsible business behavior, and some 
companies then engage third-party certifiers to ensure that their suppliers and subsidiaries 
are meeting those codes.72  The development of codes and standards and the increasing 
expectation that global firms take responsibility for implementing and enforcing these 
standards throughout their supply chains have greatly expanded the role of third-party 
assurance in global business, even though demand for quality, speed, timely-delivery and 
cost control may have provided the initial impetus for this expansion. 
 E. The growing demands for transparency (as well as quality and social 
responsibility). 
 Institutional investor networks are also asking for improved quality and quantity 
of information from their portfolio companies.  Investors in the UK have been leaders in 
this development,   In 2002, for example, the Association of British Insurers (“ABI”), 
which represents insurers that control 17% of stocks listed in the UK, issued its 
Disclosure Guidelines on Social Responsibility.73  In those guidelines, which it updated 
in 2005 and 2007,74 the ABI stated that it expects portfolio companies to provide 
information on an annual basis about how boards of directors evaluate and are addressing 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 47, 51 (2006) (analysis of the competition between forestry certification 
regimes and implications for global governance).   The FSC accredits certifying organizations, and there 
are currently 12 accredited certification organizations, including SGS, Eurocertifor, KPMG FSCI (Forest 
Certification Services Inc), Swiss Association for Quality and Managements Systems (SQS), Smartwood 
Program, and others.   See id. at 74, citing http://www.fscus.org./faqs/what_is_certification.php   
71   See http://www.fairtrade.net/certification_mark.html for an overview of the fair trade requirements. 
72   The University of Minnesota Law School, under the leadership of international human rights scholar   
Prof. David Weissbrodt, has an extensive collection of human rights materials on-line, including copies of 
hundreds of firms’ codes of conduct.  See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/sicc.html.    
73 See  http://www.abi.org.uk/Newsreleases/viewNewsRelease.asp?nrid=3676.   
74  See  http://www.politics.co.uk/press-releases/domestic-policy/environment/environment/abi-publishes-
responsible-investment-disclosure-guidelines-$464874.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
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environmental, social, and governance risks, in the context of the entire range of risks and 
opportunities facing the company.75 
 Climate change has become a particularly salient environmental risk that U.K. 
investor networks target in their disclosure requests.  One example is the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (“CDP”), a process by a group now comprised of 284 British, 
European and American institutional investors, with $41 trillion of money under 
management.76  The CDP elicits information on an annual basis from companies 
worldwide about the financial risks to the companies from the physical effects of climate 
change or from regulatory efforts to mitigate those physical changes, and about company 
actions to manage and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.77   In 2007, CDP sought 
information from 2,400 of the world’s largest quoted companies, by market 
capitalization, expanding its requests beyond the Global 500 to include the largest 
companies in various developed and rapidly developing markets, as well as the largest 
companies in transport and utilities.  These pressures from institutional investors in the 
UK and Europe have been an important impetus for new requirements in those 
jurisdictions for companies to discuss future risks to the business from social, 
environmental and community matters in their Annual Reports.78   
                                                 
75   See id. 
76   See Carbon Disclosure Website and Reports, available at http://www.cdproject.net. 
77   See Carbon Disclosure Website and Reports, available at http://www.cdproject.net/.  In 2004, 70% of 
the Global 500 firms provided information that Innovest analyzed.  (Innovest is a specialized investment 
research and advisement firm that analyzes firm-specific risk from social, environmental and stragic 
governance issues.). 
78  As of 2005, companies in Europe are required to include “a fair review of the development and 
performance of the company’s business and of its position, together with a description of the principal risks 
and uncertainties that it faces.”  In addition, “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the company’s 
development, performance or position, the analysis shall include both financial and where appropriate, 
nonfinancial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating 
to environmental and employee matters.”  Directive of Parliament 2003/51, art. 1, 14(a), 2003 O.J. (L 178), 
at 18.  For a further discussion of these requirements, see Williams & Conley, supra note 65.  
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 At the same time, firms and investors increasingly recognize that traditional 
financial measures fail to capture the value within companies from such intangible factors 
as employees’ knowledge, training and development.79  The recognition that such factors 
are important is driving a search by corporations, consultants, auditors and institutional 
investors for auditable non-financial metrics that can be used to measure and report on 
company performance in developing and protecting important intangible assets such as 
employee capabilities, brand, and reputation. 
The pressure on companies to collect and disclose more relevant non-financial 
information, has been accompanied by pressure to have their approach to assembling 
such data subject to third-party review.  In 2005, 52% of Global 250 companies issued 
non-financial, sustainability reports, including social, environmental and economic data,80 
and of these, 30% included independent, third-party assurance of the quality and accuracy 
of the underlying data.81   Major accounting firms currently dominate the non-financial 
assurance and attestation market, issuing attestation statements [CHECK distinction 
between attestation and assurance]  for 60% of those sustainability reports that are 
independently verified.82 
 Two global standards are under development for the assurance of non-financial 
reports.  In March, 2003, the UK based AccountAbility organization issued AA 1000AS, 
which focuses on evaluating the materiality, completeness and responsiveness of a 
                                                 
79 See, e.g.,  Margaret M. Blair & Steven M.H. Wallman, Unseen Wealth:  Report of the Brookings Task 
Force on Intangibles, Brookings, 2001;  Baruch Lev, Intangibles:  Management, Measurement, and 
Reporting, Brookings, 2001;  Robert G. Eccles, et. al., The Value Reporting Revolution, 2001;  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia, Extended Performance Reporting:  A Review of Empirical Studies, 
2006; and other studies documenting the growing importance of intangible assets in the value of corporate 
securities. 
80   See KPMG Global Sustainability Services, KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility 
Reporting, 2005(2005), available at http://www.kpmg.com/NR/rdonlyres/66422F7F-35AD-
4256-9BF8-F36FACCA9164/0/KPMGIntlCRSurvey2005.pdf (last visited 7/3/2006). 
81   See id. at 5, 30. 
82   See id. 
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company’s reporting to its various stakeholder groups.83  In December, 2003, the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)’s International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), which is the body responsible for issuing international 
accounting and auditing standards, issued guidance for accounting firms to use in order to 
guide their assurance work for non-financial reports.84  This standard is applicable to any 
assurance work by accountants after January 1, 2005, and was needed, according to the 
IFAC, to meet the increasing demand for assurance reports on “[e]nvironmental, social 
and sustainability reports, information systems, internal control, corporate governance 
processes and compliance with grant conditions, contracts and regulations.”85  
 
III.  An examination of these developments: China as a case study  
 In both the short run, and possibly in the long run, the developments surveyed 
above point toward a rapidly developing shift in the sources of regulatory authority 
towards private standard setting,86 and private enforcement through inspection, 
monitoring and certification services by third party assurance service organizations.  The 
increasing reliance by global corporations on third party assurance services in lieu of 
either direct control of production in facilities owned by the corporations, or court 
enforcement of contracts entered into with locally-owned businesses, raises questions 
about how corporations may be influencing the development of law and legal institutions 
                                                 
83   See  http://www.accountability.org.uk/news/default.asp?id=158 for a description of AA 1000AS and 
related technical materials. 
84   See International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000: Assurance Engagements other 
than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information See IFAC Press Release, IAASB Issues a New 
Framework and Standard for Assurance Engagement, Jan.23, 2004, available at  
http://www.ifac.org/News/LatestReleases.tmpl?NID=10748895832047605. 
85   See id. 
86   See  Nico Krisch &  Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L LAW 1 (2006). 
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in developing countries.  It seems possible, for example, that when industries and civil 
society bypass government to develop standards and private mechanisms of enforcement, 
they implicitly demonstrate the benefits to a society from having clear legal rules and 
sophisticated, independent courts that can enforce those rules.  This may help foster an 
interest on the part of middle class entrepreneurs and business people in rule of law 
institutions, thereby hastening their establishment in developing countries. 
 Business people who are under pressure to meet numerous different codes and 
standards may also begin to support regulation and enforcement by local governments to 
avoid multiple inspections and fees and possibly conflicting standards.  Moreover, once 
some businesses are required to meet higher standards, they often find that it is in their 
interest that the same regulatory requirements be imposed on their competitors.  For these 
reasons we might expect that widespread use of third party assurance services to help 
implement business norms and enforce contracts will hasten the movement toward rule of 
law. 
 On the other hand, to the extent that private-sector arrangements provide a 
satisfactory substitute for government-provided local legal institutions, they may take 
pressure off governments to build independent uncorrupted legal institutions, and thereby 
slow down the movement toward rule of law.  For example, some critics of efforts by 
NGOs to act as watchdogs in enforcing agreements about labor protections in factories 
have argued that local governments are “ceding some of their sovereignty to consumers” 
and that NGOs may thereby “ultimately undermine traditional regulatory processes.”87 
                                                 
87  O’Rourke, supra note 61, at 13. 
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 Whether we observe either outcome is likely to vary from country, to country.  It 
may also vary as between enforcing contract terms having to do with quality and timely 
delivery, versus enforcing terms established to meet social performance expectations.88 
 We do not have clear answers to these questions yet, but a telling case is the 
debate currently under way among Chinese factory owners, their corporate customers 
from developed countries, human rights and labor advocates, and Chinese government 
officials about whether Chinese firms should accept standards imposed on them by 
outsiders and submit to private third-party inspectors to ensure those standards are met.  
China's case is interesting because the emergence of a network of firms attempting to do 
inspection and certification work in China was initially driven by the demand by 
developed country apparel firms and retailers that supplier firms in China meet social 
standards, especially for workplace safety and fair labor practices.  But it is now rapidly 
spreading to other industries, and, more importantly, the Chinese appear to be trying to 
take responsibility themselves for creating social standards and for certifying that 
factories meet those standards. 
The story of China's amazing rush to industrialize and compete in the global 
economy in the last two decades is now fairly well known.  China began opening up its 
markets and encouraging production of goods for foreign markets in the 1980s, and by 
the mid- to late-1990s had become one of the world's largest suppliers of textile and 
apparel products, toys, and other labor-intensive, relatively low-technology products.89  
Early on in this process, little attention was paid either by Chinese factory managers or by 
                                                 
88  The latter may also be imposed on local firm suppliers through compliance clauses in contracts with 
global customers. 
89   It was also rapidly becoming a supplier of more technologically-intensive products, but apparel 
products and toys were the first industries where global corporations began trying to impose social 
responsibility requirements on the Chinese suppliers. 
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their global customers to how such products were made.  Buyers were focused mainly on 
price, delivery speed, quality, and reliability.  These are factors that buyers can observe 
for themselves with simple goods like apparel and toys, and they consequently did not 
worry about the conditions under which the products were being made. 
 By the early 1990s, however, the international press began writing stories about 
the appalling conditions in factories where branded products were being made.90  By 
1995 and 1996, a few high-visibility corporations, including Nike, The Gap, and Kathy 
Lee Gifford's apparel line for Wal-Mart, were being targeted relentlessly by news reports 
and social activists for operating sweatshops in developing countries.  In response, some 
firms adopted their own codes of practice for their vendors. 91   But that didn't end the 
drumbeat of bad publicity, so the industry began working with NGOs, labor organizations 
and other groups to develop codes of best practice and to figure out how to get their 
supplier firms to implement them.  (See discussion above in Section II (D))  The SA 8000 
standards were among the first such codes,92  Since 2000, numerous international 
companies that have Chinese factories in their supply chains have been attempting to 
require that the Chinese factories meet a variety of social responsibility standards, 
                                                 
90  See e.g. Philip Shenon, Made in the U.S.A.?  Hard Labor on a Pacific Island/A Special Report:  Saipan 
Sweatshops are No American Dream, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1993 (describing sweatshop practices at 
factories that supplied Arrow, Liz Claiborne, The Gap, Montgomery Ward, Geoffrey Been, Eddie Bauer, 
and Levi Strauss). 
91  Levi Strauss adopted "Global Sourcing Guidelines" in 1992;  Reebok adopted "Human Rights Protection 
Standards" and Wal-Mart published Standards for Vender Partners in 1993, The Gap first adopted a Code 
of Vender Conduct in 1993. See Schoenberger, supra note 56, at 58-65. 
92  This code was actually developed by the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Association 
(CEPAA) in 1997, but CEPAA changed its name to Social Accountability International in 2000, and the 
code has since been called SA 8000.  See Overview of SA 8000 on the website of SAI, available at 
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473.   
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including SA 8000, WRAP, and ICTII (toy manufacturers) and some codes developed 
internally by certain large buyers.93 
 Just telling factories that they must meet certain standards does not make it 
happen in practice, however.94  The mechanism that global customers have used to 
pressure supplier factories to meet standards is the requirement in their contracts with 
Chinese companies that the factories be inspected and certified either by inspectors from 
the buyer corporation, or by third party inspectors and certifiers.95 
 The initial reaction of Chinese manufacturing companies (as well as some 
Chinese scholars, policy analysts and businessmen) to customer pressures to meet social 
standards such as SA8000 was surprise, hostility to the standards, and panic because 
meeting the standards would require higher costs and make it more difficult, factory 
owners believed, for Chinese firms to win contracts with big buyers.96  Some went so far 
                                                 
93  One article in a Chinese publication estimates that eighty percent of the 95 surveyed export factories in 
southeast China have experienced various forms of factory inspection demanded by their western clients. 
See Shenzhen Ni Tui Xing Qi Ye She Hui Ze Ren Ren Zheng [Shenzhen Is Planning To Carry Out CSR 
Certification], available at http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/wtoyfz/LTXX/2005-10/04/1137250995.html 
(last visited June 13, 2006). This does not mean that these factories have all been subject to third party 
inspection and certification, though. As the Chinese suppliers reported in other surveys, many buyers 
conduct some kind of social inspections either by themselves or by independent auditors. As of September 
30, 2005, only 106 Chinese companies  had obtained SA8000 certification, while a survey conducted by 
researchers at Tsinghua University and supported by the Ford Foundation revealed that until 2002 there had 
been at least 8000 factories in the coastal area subject to some kind of social inspections by their buyers. 
This indicates that many social inspections are not formal third party inspections. 
94   Levi-Strauss, Reebok, Wal-Mart and the Gap have all had vendor codes of conduct since the early 
1990s, see supra note 91, and yet adopting the codes and getting them implemented are different things. 
95  Wal-Mart, for example, claims that it requires that plants from which it buys products must submit to 
periodic inspections either by Wal-Mart employees, or by third-party inspectors. See 
http://www.walmart.com/corporatesocialresponsibility (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).  
96  The discussion of the controversy over factory inspection and corporate social responsibility in China is 
adapted from Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social Accountability Standards in the Global Supply Chain:  
Resistance, Reconsideration and Resolution in China, U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
LE06-018 (2006), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=916929.  Ms. Lin's research has been 
supplemented and largely confirmed by internet-based research by research assistants Bixuan Wu, Lily 
Huang, and Tracy Dry Kane.  Mr.Wu searched Chinese websites beginning with the phrase "Corporate 




as to charge that the requirement was a new form of non-tariff barrier,97 a protectionist 
measure designed to “undercut competitiveness of developing countries.”98  For reasons 
that aren't entirely clear, the SA8000 certification program has been the most 
controversial and in the last few years, in fact, has become a lightning rod for widespread 
resentment and distrust among owners and operators of Chinese facilities that are asked 
to meet the standards by their big-name global customers. 
 Chinese critics of social responsibility standards have further challenged the 
purpose of the SA8000 requirements on the grounds that few facilities in developed 
countries have been required to meet SA8000 standards, and that, while SA8000 requires 
that certified facilities must protect freedom of association, the rate of unionization in the 
United States, where SA8000 standards were developed, is very low.99  And critics have 
expressed resentment about meeting SA8000 requirements because the SA8000 process 
is costly, often requiring that fees be paid to certification bodies not only for the 
certification itself, but for consulting assistance required to meet the standards.  It is 
widely believed in China that the high consulting fees are products of the unregulated 
                                                                                                                                                 
%E4%BB%BB%22 (last visited July 3, 2006).  As of July 3, Google found 230,000 entries under the 
search term "企业社会责任". 
97  See, e.g., She hui zhe ren ren zheng kao yan Zhong Guo chu kou qi ye [Corporate Social Certification 
Challenges Chinese Exporting Companies], available at 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20040624/jj/qs/200406240034.asp (last visited June 13, 2006). 
98  Zhongguo zu hao zhun bei ying tiao zhan [China Gets Ready to Take Challenges], People Daily [sic], 
2004.10.22 (reporting that the U.S., EU and Japan will continue to use technical trade barriers, intellectual 
property rights and SA8000 to increase the China textile production costs and curtail China’s 
competitiveness.); Fa da guo jia wu quiang zing tui zing SA8000 biao zhun ren zheng [Developed 
Countries Want to Impose the SA8000 Certification], Market Post, 2004.5.14; Zhen zheng de kao yian dao 
le [The Real Challenge Comes], People Daily (Overseas edition), 2004.1.02 (asserting that SA8000 is a 
non-tariff trade barrier). 
99 The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 12.5 % of wage and salary 
workers were union members in 2005. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006) 
 34
certification markets. 100  Moreover, the unwillingness of buyer corporations to absorb the 
additional cost of meeting social standards, plus the lack of training and unprofessional 
behavior by auditors for the certifying firms, have led Chinese firms to believe that the 
certification process is not taken seriously by buyer firms, and, in practice, certification is 
more or less an extortion scheme, in which certifying organizations will certify 
manufacturing facilities that adequately pay off the certifier.101  Not surprisingly, some 
Chinese suppliers have found ways to falsify their records and satisfy the auditors with 
superficial changes.102 
 Participants in the debate over SA 8000 in China have also charged that, while 
imposition of social accountability standards by multinational companies may please the 
customers of those companies, this amounts to "value imperialism" by western society.103 
Factories that supply products for China's domestic market are not being required to meet 
similar standards, they note.  The reality behind this complaint, however, is more 
complicated.  China's own labor protection laws are in fact very similar to the 
requirements of SA8000, though, in practice, they are typically not enforced for lack of 
                                                 
100 See Li You-Huan, SA8000 wu Zhongguo qu ye she hui zhe ren jian she [SA8000 and the Construction of 
Chinese Corporate Social Responsibility] 178 (2004), at 265  (reporting  that a typical facility with 300 
workers would have to pay the equivalent of $6,000 for the certification, but more than $60,000 once the 
consulting fees are added in. ). Note that  SA8000 certifications are good for three years as long as no 
major violations are found during occasional inspections.   
101  Wang Lin, the Chief Technical Advisor to the ILO in China, complained that SAI is a consulting firm, 
setting up its own standards and then trying to sell them. See Bei kua de le de SA8000 ren zheng [The 
Exaggerated SA8000 Certification], ECONOMIC OBSERVER, Aug. 9, 2004 No 172. 
102  See Tan Shen & Liu Kaiming ed., Kua guo gong si de she hui ze ren yu Zhongguo she hui [Social 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations & the Chinese Society] 14 (2003)., at 186, and Helle Bank 
Jørgensen et. al., Strengthening Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply 
Chains, prepared for the Corporate Social Responsibility Practice in the Investment Climate Department of 
the World Bank Group, p. 20 (reporting that some apparel suppliers confessed that they skillfully had 
developed the art of seeming to be in compliance without making changes).  See also Secrets, Lies and 
Sweatshops, BUS. WK. Nov. 27, 2006.  
103  See Lin, supra note 93.   
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resources and other factors.104  By contrast, multinational firms with the help of the 
inspection/certification firms, can enforce the SA8000 requirements, by threatening to 
cancel orders if plants fail to meet standards as reported by the certifying firms.105  This 
suggests that the multinational corporations who are insisting on third party inspection to 
enforce social norms in Chinese factories are, in fact, merely implementing standards that 
China's own leaders have articulated in Chinese law. 
 Moreover, recent developments in China suggest that resistance to the social 
performance standards implied by SA 8000 and other internationally imposed standards 
may be softening, that China may even be moving to embrace and implement such 
standards on their own.  One surprising development is the fact that job growth in the 
industrial regions of China has actually exceeded the pace at which potential workers are 
                                                 
104  The contents of SA8000 are not very different from the requirements of China's labor law. SA8000 
provides criteria for limiting child labor or forced labor, for health and safety standards, for freedom of 
association and rights to collective bargaining, prohibiting discrimination, identifying permissible 
discipline, defining working hours, compensation and management systems. Article 15 of the PRC Labor 
Law likewise prohibits hiring persons under the age of 16, while Articles 17 and 32(2) address forced labor.  
Article 52 requires employers to set up health and safety protections for employees. Article 7 states that 
employees have rights to participate and establish unions. Article 8 deals with collective bargaining. Article 
12 bans discrimination. Article 36 requires that working hours not exceed 8 hours per day, or 44 hours per 
week. Article 41 requires that overtime hours not exceed 3 hours per day, or 36 hours per month. Articles 
48 and 49 set forth minimum wages.  Note that as to the working hours, SA8000 has a less strict standard 
(48 hours per week) than the Labor Law (44 hours per week). The differences between SA8000 and the 
Labor Law are therefore minimal, but SA8000 has more detailed implementation guidelines and the 
potential for actual enforcement.  The inspections by local governments in China are perfunctory, however, 
and imprisonment for labor activism notorious.  See Stephen F. Diamond, The “Race to the Bottom” 
Returns: China’s Challenge to the International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS INT’L L. & POL’Y 39 
(2003);  See also Li Li-Qing & Li Yan-Ling, Qi ye she hui ze ren yan jiu [Studies on Enterprise's Social 
Accountability] 229 (2005). 
105  There are frequent reports in Chinese media of orders from multinational companies being cancelled 
because of low wages, long working hours and poor working conditions. See, e.g., Shehui zheren renzheng 
kauyan Zhongguo chukou qiye [Corporate Social Certification Challenges Chinese Exporting Companies], 
NANFANG DAILY, June 24, 2004 (reporting that a toy company having 4 factories and nearly 8000 
workers in Shenzhen, lost business from its multinational buyers and closed down in 2002 because of 
wages below acceptable minima, long working hours and poor working conditions); Qiye shehui zheren 
pinggu puo ju shashangli [Corporate Social Accountability Assessment Has Lethality](reporting that a shoe 
factory with about 500 workers in Zhongshan City of the Guangdong Provinces had orders cancelled  by its 
buyers in September 2002, idling it for two months, because of non-compliance of the legal minimum 
wages requirement), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper49/11305/1021009.html (last visited 
August 12, 2006). 
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flowing into those regions from rural areas, creating some actual shortages of skilled or 
experienced labor in some areas.106  The shortages are blamed in part on "low wages and 
poor working conditions,"107 but may also be due to migration policies in China designed 
to slow the movement of people out of the countryside into the urban industrial 
centers.108 
 The second development is the growing unrest in China over the widening gap 
between rich and poor, between interior areas and coastal regions, as well as between 
urban and rural regions, and the dissatisfaction of lower-income groups over low pay and 
the appalling standards at factories that serve only domestic markets.109  These two 
factors have led China's own working classes and intellectual elite to begin demanding 
that factories that serve only the domestic market should also be required to meet higher 
standards for safety and worker protection.110   
 In response to these problems, there has been a subtle change in attitude toward 
"corporate social responsibility" standards among scholars, officials, and the general 
public in China.  For example, derogatory words such as "stick" (Da Bang), and "non-
tariff barrier" are being used less frequently.111  Moreover, the Chinese central 
                                                 
106  See David Barboza, Sharp Labor Shortage in China May Lead to World Trade Shift, N. Y. Times, April 
3, 2006, at A1, and Report on Labor Shortage (2004), released by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
of China, available at http://www.gd.lss.gov.cn/gb/molss/bzyw/news/view.asp?id=787 . 
107  See supra note 106, Report on Labor Shortage. 
108  See Xe Frank He, Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants in Beijing: Institutional Conflict and Ineffective 
Campaigns, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 177 (2003).  
109  See China's Parliament to Begin Annual Session, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-
03/03/content_2642667.htm (last visited June 13, 2006). 
110  See China Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s Government Work Report at the opening meeting of the annual 
session of the National People's Congress on March 5, 2007, the official Chinese full-text version available 
at http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2006-03/15/content_227782.htmCites. 
111  See e.g., Mei Yu Xiang Wo Tui SA8000 Da Bang, San Jiao Kong Cheng Zhai Qu [The United States 
Wants to Use the Stick of SA8000, the Pearl Delta is Likely to be a Disaster Zone], available at 
http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/zgqy/925860.htm (last visited June 13, 2006), and Zhong Guo Qi 
Ye Zao Yu Yin Xin Mao Yi Bi Lei [Chinese Corporations Encountered Invisible Trade Barrier], available 
at  http://www.mie168.com/manage/2006-06/160439.htm (last visited June 13, 2006). 
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government has explicitly endorsed a number of goals related to corporate social 
responsibility.  In its Five Year Plan for National Economic & Social Development of the 
People's Republic of China adopted in March, 2006, by the National People's Congress, 
two of the twelve national priorities listed in the Plan relate directly to improving the 
standards of social responsibility to which Chinese firms are held.  These are "building a 
socialist harmonious society," and "building a resource-conserving and environment-
friendly society."112  It has become widely accepted among scholars and officials that the 
implementation of socially responsible norms by business is an integral part of what the 
phrase building a "harmonious socialist society" means.113 
 China's new embrace of the idea of requiring socially responsible behavior by 
business firms, however, may not, in the long run, translate into more business for 
western inspection and certification services.  Within the last year, the Chinese 
government in Beijing has authorized the Ministry of Commerce to work with seven 
other Chinese agencies to develop "corporate social responsibility" standards, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
112  See Report on the Implementation of the 2005 Plan for National Economic and Social Development 
And on the 2006 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social Development, delivered at the Fourth 
Session of the 10th National People's Congress on March 5, 2006, (“III. Principal Tasks and Measures for 
Economic and Social Development in 2006. . . . 10. We will conscientiously work to resolve problems that 
affect the vital interests of the people and pay very close attention to safeguarding social stability. We will 
promote the building of a harmonious society, focusing on increasing employment, improving the social 
security system, distributing wealth more equitably and safeguarding social stability. -- 1) We will continue 
to follow a vigorous employment policy . . . . 2) We will speed up development of the social security 
system . . . . 3) We will make appropriate adjustments in income distribution . . . . 4) We will help needy 
urban and rural residents in their work and lives . . . . 5) We will further strengthen production safety 
management. . . . 6) We will safeguard and promote social stability . . . .” ), available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006lh/161917.htm (last visited June 13, 2006). 
113 See Qiang Hua Qi Ye She Hui Ze Ren Shi Jian He Xie She Hui De Zhong Yao Nei Rong [Strengthening 
of Corporate Social Responsibility is an Important Part of Building a Harmonious Society], available at 
http://www.sa8000.org.cn/TNC/2186.html (last visited June 13, 2006); Gou Jian He Xie She Bi Xu Qiang 
Hua Qi Ye She Hui Ze Ren [To Build a Harmonious Society, Strengthening of Corporate Social 
Responsibility is a Must], available at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/gjhxsh/1054890.htm (last 
visited June 13, 2006); Lu Xing Qi Ye She Hui Ze Ren Cu Jin He Xie She Hui Jian She [Discharge 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Facilitate Building a Harmonious Society], available at 
http://www.sa8000.org.cn/TNC/712.html (last visited June 13, 2006). 
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China National Textile and Apparel Council has created the Committee for the Promotion 
of Corporate Social Accountability System for Chinese Textile Enterprises.  This set of 
standards has been given the title "CSC9000T" (in obvious imitation of the "ISO9000" 
and "SA8000" models114), and bears a strong resemblance to standards developed by 
WRAP and SAI for apparel and textile manufacturing facilities.  CSC9000T is defined as 
"a social responsibility management system based on the Chinese laws and regulations, 
international conventions and practices, as well as China's special needs."115  A special 
committee, the Responsible Supply Chain Association, has been established by the China 
National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) to promote the implementation of 
CSC9000T.116 
 Both the English and Chinese versions of the CSC9000T website make clear, 
though, that “[t]he CSC9000T is not intended for the purpose of audit and 
certification.”117 Instead of following the certification model developed in western 
countries, CSC9000T invents a so-called “third-party evaluation model” structured with 
Chinese characteristics. CSC9000T is described as a management model based on a 
“Plan-Do-Check-Act” system. “Check” means evaluating systems of production, 
identifying problems and finding solutions. The process is aided by third party evaluation 
organizations. The evaluation reports by the third party organizations are subject to the 
final approval by the Responsible Supply Chain Association (RSCA), which is a group of 
                                                 
114  According to the Chinese language version of the website regarding CSC 9000T, the numbering system 
for these corporate behavior and certification models is intended to imitate ISO14000. 
115  Information regarding CSC9000T is available at 
http://www.CSC9000TT.org.cn/en/FAQ.asp?ID=80&More=2&ID2=99&More2=0&MoreLink=true&LID
=8&i=2&EndList=11 (last visited June 13, 2006). 
116  Id. 
117 See 
http://www.csc9000.org.cn/en/FAQ.asp?ID=80&More=2&ID2=99&More2=0&MoreLink=true&LID=10&
i=2&EndList=11#6 (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) 
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companies doing business in China with a commitment to CSC9000T.  Firms then 
develop plans to address problems identified in the evaluation, and their efforts to 
implement these plans will eventually be rated by the third party evaluation organization. 
The ratings are either defensive, complaint, managerial, strategic or civil.  It is claimed by 
the CSC9000T that these ratings are basically the five stages of constructing corporate 
social responsibility.  The evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the 
public, however.  According to the CSC9000T Principles, a firm can demonstrate its 
compliance with the CSC Principles to its stakeholders, buyers or other third parties by 
voluntarily disclosing the results of the evaluation, but that is not a required part of the 
process. 
RSCA is, in principle, responsible for ensuring the independence of the so-called 
“third party evaluation organizations” by evaluating the capacity of the organizations, the 
training of evaluators, monitoring of the evaluation process conducted by the third party 
evaluation organizations and handling of disputes over ratings and reports.   Currently 
there are 168 members of RSCA, including state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, 
wholly foreign enterprises, and Chinese firms, although most are domestic Chinese firms.  
There are two non-Chinese domestic companies – Hudson’s Bay Company, a large 
department store group in Canada; and Linmark Group, a Hong-Kong Based company – 
that have endorsed CSC9000T by being cooperative partners with RSCA. 
Substantively, CSC9000T is more like ISO14000 than SA8000 with regard to the 
underlying philosophy being used.   That is, the standards set forth in the CSC9000T are 
long-term goals or commitments rather than immediately applicable substantive 
standards.  CSC9000T is a management tool to help a firm manage its social 
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responsibility risk, as well as improve its performance, rather than a standard by which to 
certify performance.  The function of the CSC9000T is said to be to promote continual 
improvement in labor protection, without an explicit substantive end-point that has been 
defined.  Procedurally, CSC9000T provides for “third party evaluation organizations,” 
but these organizations’ functions are limited and their independence is questionable.  
RSCA controls the process, from deciding the eligibility of evaluating organizations and 
monitoring the process of evaluations to approving the actual reports that the evaluators 
generate.  Since the members of the RSCA are the same firms that are subject to 
CSC9000T evaluation – Chinese domestic companies – there is the obvious potential for 
conflicts of interest, and for the process to be used to promote the appearance but not the 
reality of improving labor and other social conditions.  Moreover, since the evaluation 
reports and ratings will not be available to the public, the pressure from buyers in the 
supply chain may still be the only mechanism for ensuring these firms actually improve 
their labor standards.   And, so far as we can tell, there are no global customers accepting 
CSC9000T evaluations instead of certification to SA8000, or WRAP, or to the 
customers’ codes of conduct. 
What effect of CSC9000T will have on the development of law and norms in 
China is not yet known, of course, and it is too soon to be entirely confident about its 
likely effect.  While CSC9000T does not, in principle, have the force of law, it may 
nonetheless be useful in helping local government officials develop the capacity to 
evaluate manufacturing facilities.  To the extent that CSC9000T embodies the existing 
requirements of Chinese law, it would be appropriate for local governments to develop 
this capability.  In fact, local government officials might well view the development of 
CSC9000T by the quasi-official National Textile and Apparel Council as encouragement 
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from China's central government for them to be more proactive in enforcing existing law.  
To the extent that such evaluations generate income (from inspection fees, for example, 
or perhaps from fines for violations of legal codes), local governments may have a 
financial incentive to become more proactive in enforcing labor law as written.  
 
IV.  Theoretical and policy implications. 
 This article bridges two previously distinct fields of law, one that has to do with 
the institutions and mechanisms by which private contracts are drafted and enforced, and 
the other which has to do with how corporate behavior is policed, especially in the 
international arena. 
 A.  The contractual role of third party assurance.  On the contract side, the role 
being played by third-party assurance in global commerce can be understood as a 
mechanism for solving a number of common contracting problems. 118 
 First, we can think of the relationship between a manufacturing firm in a 
developing country and a global corporation that contracts to buy the output of the 
manufacturer as an “agency” relationship, in which the manufacturer is making 
specialized goods on behalf of the global corporation.  In any agency relationship we 
would expect to find problems arising from “asymmetric information” (The agent has 
knowledge about his performance that the principal does not have.) and from 
misalignment of incentives (The agent doesn’t always have an incentive to perform in a 
way that is in the principal’s best interest.).   
                                                 
118  See, e.g., Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, Ch.3, at 88, in ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY, FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS (1987)(Truman F. Bewley, ed.)(“agency relationships create 
a demand for monitoring.”). 
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 Employing third-party assurance services can help address both problems by 
monitoring the agent’s activities on behalf of the principal.  On one hand, using a third-
party assurance service might increase agency costs by engaging yet another agent – with 
all the associated information asymmetry and incentive problems.  On the other, the 
third-party assurance organization may in many instances have several monitoring 
advantages relative to the cost of the principal either doing its own monitoring or simply 
living with the discrepancy between what the global corporation wants and what the 
manufacturing firm actually does.  Relying on the assurance firm may also save costs for 
the principal because they specialize in monitoring certain kinds of problems, and thereby 
bring certain expertise to bear in gathering and interpreting the necessary information. 
 Second, contracts between global corporation and a developing country supplier 
may inevitably be incomplete in some ways.119  In parts of the world where legal systems 
are well-developed, contracting parties can have access to courts if they get into a dispute 
about some aspect of the relationship, and courts can generally be relied upon to decide 
the dispute by imputing terms that may be missing in the formal contract.  If courts are 
regarded by both parties to the contract as neutral, independent and reasonably 
sophisticated, the parties are likely to be comfortable with this approach to dispute 
resolution.  But where contracting parties do not have a high level of confidence in courts 
of law, we might expect to find alternative arrangements that involve appeals to neutral, 
but sophisticated third parties such as arbitrators and assurance firms.  Recognizing this 
issue, China, for example, established a quasi-governmental organization, CIETAC, 
                                                 
119  We will not even attempt to summarize that work here, and will certainly not cite all the scholarship on 
the subject.  But see Hart and Holmstrom, supra note 118, for a useful discussion of the implications of 
incomplete contracts.  See also PAUL MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND 
MANAGEMENT 133 (1992) for a brief and accessible introduction to the economic theories of incomplete 
contracts. 
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whose roots go back to the 1950s for the purpose of arbitrating disputes between Chinese 
firms and foreign companies doing business with China.  Third-party assurance 
organizations of the type we are considering in this article do not handle complex 
contract disputes, but they may be able to resolve relatively simple questions about 
contractual performance, such as whether the manufacturing contractor maintains a 
“safe” workplace and does not employ child labor. 
 Third, it is a well-understood phenomenon in contract theory that performance 
problems in contractual relationships can be substantially reduced if both parties to the 
contract have reputational capital at risk in the relationship.120  Parties that have a 
reputation for honesty, competence, and fair-dealing can reduce their costs of contracting 
because their contractual partners know that the advantages of cheating in a particular 
relationship are likely to be more than offset by the costs to the firm from reputational 
damage.  In the relationship between a large, globally-recognized corporation and a local 
manufacturing firm in a developing country, the global company is likely to have more 
reputational capital at stake to constrain its behavior and bond its commitments, at least 
initially.  The supplier firm may have strong incentives to develop a reputation as an 
honest and reliable trading partner over time, but may initially need to expend resources 
to build that reputation.  Employing third-party assurance services may serve that 
function by acting as a “reputational interemediary.”  This may work because the 
assurance firm has little in the way of assets except its reputation, and it has no direct 
stake in the outcome of any evaluation it performs.  It may therefore may be more 
credible in how it evaluates the supplier-firm’s performance. 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in 
Economic Development, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1517 (2006) 
. 
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 In recent years, economists and legal scholars interested in economic 
development have begun focusing on another type of contractual problem, which is the 
problem that arises when the legal system is weak, corrupt or unsophisticated, so that the 
contracting parties cannot count on courts and officers of the law for fair and independent 
adjudication and enforcement of contracts.  Such circumstances are common in many 
developing countries, and a growing literature argues that the resulting lack of reliable 
property or contract enforcement may be a major factor impeding economic 
development.121  In such situations, the parties may be able to anticipate and specify in 
fairly fine detail who is to do what under what circumstances, but that may be of small 
comfort if there is no authority available who can enforce the terms. 
 One might expect that the same institutional arrangements that make a contract 
“self-enforcing” might also be used extensively to govern business relationships when 
enforcement authorities are weak, corrupt, or unsophisticated.  An alternative, however, 
might be for the contracting parties to develop systems of private contract enforcement, 
such as agreements to rely on the assessments of third party inspectors and verifiers for a 
determination of whether contract terms were satisfied.  It appears to us that this is what 
is happening now in many contexts around the world.  In the interaction between global 
corporations and local firms in developing countries, the parties may, in effect be 
importing resources for private law enforcement to interpret contract terms and determine 
whether they have been met. 
 Third-part assurance firms may thus supply certain contract facilitating and 
enforcing functions in developing countries that might be supplied by formal legal 
                                                 
121 See e.g., Douglass North, supra note 7; Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights 
Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 90 (2003).  
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institutions in developed countries.  In performing these functions, the assurance service 
can perhaps be understood to be importing “rule of law” procedural norms into countries 
where legal institutions are weak. 
 B.  The regulatory role of third-party assurance.  On the question of how the 
behavior of global corporations is to be regulated and policed, the phenomenon of third-
party assurance can be examined in light of so-called “new governance” theories,122 or 
“global administrative law” theories,123 which have been exploring the role of private 
actors in public “law-making.”  These theories recognize that today we observe an 
accelerating diffusion of regulatory power among networks of state and non-state actors 
that transcend national boundaries124   A central premise of these theories is that in the 
global economy, “regulatory governance function[s] in a manner not dependent on state 
law or in which state law is not central,” that there is “ a loosening of the sharp 
distinction between states and  markets and between the public and the private.”125  Thus, 
transnational regulation is now understood to encompass: 
                                                 
122   A central contributor to the development of new governance theories is Prof. Colin Scott, Research 
Associate in the London School of Economics’ Center for Regulation and Risk, and Professor of EU 
Regulation and Governance, University College, Dublin.  For an introduction to Prof. Scott’s work, see 
Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State, Austrl. Nat’l 
Univ., Nat’l Europe Centre Paper No. 100 (2003), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/scott.  For a thoughtful  
overview of new governance theories, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).     
123  See Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart & Wiener, supra note 8, introducing the concept of “global 
administrative law.”   
124    It can be argued that self-regulatory, private initiatives within various industries are hardly new 
developments either.  One can think of guilds or lex mercatoria regimes in the Middle Ages in  Europe as 
historical examples of such self-regulation.  This may simply indicate that law scholars have generally 
tended to define the term “regulation” too narrowly, and that focusing attention on the “new” regulatory 
regimes engendered by economic globalization has led many scholars to more clearly recognize the 
regulatory implications of private action—implications that could have been observed more systematically 
previously, but that are now getting sustained academic attention.  See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of 
Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 
979 (2007) (asserting that “today, the lines between private and public functions are increasingly blurred,” 
but that legal scholars often too sharply emphasize the distinction between regulatory and deregulatory 
regimes.)  
125   Scott, supra note 122, at 2-3. 
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“regulation by non-regulation (laissez-faire), through formal self-regulation (such 
as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, 
business-NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid public-private 
regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private 
agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental 
standards of another country), network governance by state officials (as in the 
work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
on environmental policies to be followed by national export credit agencies), 
inter-governmental organizations with direct governance powers (as with 
determinations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of 
individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution system for trade 
conflicts).126 
 
The phenomenon we study in this paper points to an emerging alternative 
mechanism of regulation that is tied to private contractual relationships.   As we noted 
above, global, branded companies are exposed to ever greater risks as their supply chains 
lengthen, as production is moved outside of the firm, and as companies increasingly 
come under pressure to demonstrate that the conditions of production in their supply 
chains meet international standards.  Given these pressures, companies are including 
“regulatory” standards for health, safety, conditions of employment and environmental 
management in their supply-chain contracts,127 and then engaging various certifying 
organizations to provide assurance that the standards have been met. 
Thus, the role being played by third-party assurance may be a merging of private 
law contractual mechanisms for organizing production with public law activities of 
standard setting and enforcement. 
 
                                                 
126   Kingsbury et al., supra note 8, at 2. 
127  Supply contracts are usually confidential and not accessible to the public. Certain companies’ contracts 
are filed as part of their annual or quarterly securities reports, however, and thus available in the 
EDGARPlus(R) database of LexisNexis.  By using the keywords  “supplier code of conduct” and “material 
contract,”  we found companies, such as Tommy Hilfiger Corp. (Exhibit 10 to 10-K, filed on June 26, 
2001),  Warnoco Group (Exhibit 10 to  10-K, filed on March 18, 2004), Phoenix Footware Group (Exhibit 
10 to 10-Q, filed on Nov. 15, 2005) and Global Beverage Solutions (Exhibit 10 to 8-K, filed on June 7, 
2006), incorporated such regulatory standards into their supply contracts.  
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V.  Conclusions. 
 We have suggested in this paper that a new private sector mechanism is emerging 
and operating globally that may provide a substitute for law and formal legal structures 
both in contract enforcement and in policing the social behavior of firms.  The third-party 
assurance industry, which came to sudden prominence in international commerce in 
recent years initially to provide expert evaluations of product qualities for purposes of 
enforcing private contracts, is now being deployed globally to implement and enforce 
social standards.  In the process, the activities of these organizations may be having the 
effect of promulgating international business norms and standards of human rights, labor 
protection, and social responsibility. 
 Even where local law as written is consistent with such international standards 
(such as seems to be true at least for labor protection in China), third party assurance 
provides an enforcement mechanism would otherwise be lacking in many countries.  
Moreover, as we have seen in the Chinese case study, importing international standards 
and private sector enforcers may have the effect of hastening the development of formal 
legal institutions that have the potential to implement and enforce for those standards. 
 This is clearly not the only possible interpretation of these developments.  
Commercial interests have long established parallel institutions for the arbitration of 
commercial disputes that do not depend on local judicial systems, and do not necessarily 
have any positive effect on those judicial systems.128  Some commentators have even 
suggested that arbitration of commercial disputes can undermine public law 
developments by allowing firms to contract around public law, even the laws of 
                                                 
128 Reference here merchant guild courts. 
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developed economies such as the EU or US.129  So we recognize the need for us to do 
further theoretical work to determine what aspects of “rule of law” are more amenable to 
influence by the developments described in this paper, and then test those theories by 
evaluating in detail the effect that strengthening commercial substitutes for local judicial 
enforcement has on public judicial and legal establishments. 
We want to know more, for example, about the political dynamic that has given 
rise to, and that is now responding to third party assurance regimes as enforcers of social 
standards.  It seems likely, for example, that the new Chinese social responsibility 
standard, CSC9000T, will not replace third party assurance unless foreign buyers treat a 
CSC9000T evaluation as the substantial equivalent of an audit and certification, to a 
Western standard or code of conduct, by an independent third party.  For the reasons 
identified above, however, foreign buyers will undoubtedly be cautious about embracing 
CSC9000T—in significant part because it neither provides public acknowledgement nor 
credible assurance that suppliers have actually met acceptable social standards for 
production. 
This suggests an interesting Catch-22 for NGOs, activists, business people and 
financial institutions who want to see social and political reform in developing countries.  
The importation of Western standards and third-party certification may, in the short run, 
help to impose norms and rule of law values such as transparency and accountability in 
developing economies, including in China.  These standards may require more stringent 
human rights or labor protections than those offered by the law as enforced, as in China, 
                                                 
129   See, e.g., Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West 
Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT’L LAW  427 (2001).  On balance, Prof. McConnaughay thinks that 
transfer of authority to arbitral institutions is a net positive for commercial predictability in Asia, but a net 
negative when companies can “contract out of “ developed economy law by transferring their disputes to 
arbitral institutions. 
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but may be consistent with the protections some Chinese political reformers and 
intellectuals advocate.  In some enterprises, such as toys, apparel and sports equipment 
manufacturers, for example, it appears to us that the existence of external pressures from 
foreign buyers has allowed some Chinese citizens greater degree of freedom so that they 
have been able to advocate for reforms such as expanded labor rights and better human 
rights protection.130  To the extent that participants in and around Chinese enterprise 
participate in developing business norms and social assurance standards and procedures 
modeled on Western variants, then, they are essentially engaging in type of political 
action in a context that is likely to be less threatening to the government than other types 
of political activity.  Such a development may ultimately be a powerful lever for political 
liberalization in China. 
                                                 
Of course it may also be that China’s experience is atypical.  While it is certainly 
the case that the assurance service business has grown dramatically in size and in 
importance in China in the last decade, it has also become extremely important around 
the world, from Mexico to India to Thailand and Vietnam, to Turkey and Eastern Europe 
and South Africa.  And, just as in China, the industry seems to be playing both a contract 
enforcement role, and a role in introducing and enforcing social norms and standards 
wherever it is operating.  We are unaware, however, of local governments outside of 
China that are attempting to create their own regulatory and inspection regimes in 
response to the activities of the private sector assurance organizations.  These are all 
questions that await further research. 
130  In interviews of company executives in large retail firms in the United States with responsibility for 
supply chain management, conducted with Prof. John Conley as part of projects to explore the CSR trend in 
business, we have heard this point made: that by coming in with their CSR requirements, companies give 
Chinese managers and government officials who want reform a safe rationale to use to argue for such 
reform.  See Conley & Williams, supra note 65, at  8, fn. 49 for a description of the research methodology.   
